For the International Joint Research Center International Conference [Global Crisis and Sustainability of East Asia] March 22, 2009, Hitotsubashi University



## Global Crisis and East Asia: Momentum for the Regional Currency Regime

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
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
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
- External shocks brought by crisis via exchange rate fluctuation affect both real and financial performance of national economies.
- >A small open economy like Korea suffers from huge devaluations, prone to inflation pressure and reduction in the relative gains from exports.
- >A large open economy with moderate openness in trade and finance like Japan observes strong yen, but at a cost of corporate competitiveness at the international stage. Exports and investments fall.
- >A large economy with a fixed exchange rate regime like China experiences large drop in its exports and in growth. Keeping the value of the Yuan high is getting more difficult.
- On the real side economies like these suffer from lower growth and thus loss of employment. On the monetary side they face undesirable situation regarding the values of their currencies.





# Internationalization of currencies gains interests of policy makers

- Internationalization of a currency endogenizes external economic shocks to the degree of internationalization. (e.g. seignorage) Therefore it helps to reduce the impact of external shocks on domestic economy. It could be an interesting and plausible policy choice.
- But there are possibilities of hazardous effects. This means that markets are more liberalized. For instance the economy could be more prone to speculative attacks.
- Policy dilemma: in current crisis currency instability increases, which induces attempts to increase financial market protection and internalization of currency by way of exchange market intervention or protective measures.



#### II. Conditions for international currency

#### Conditions for international currency (Joint work with Seunggwan Baek)

- Factors to affect whether or not a currency would become an international currency include the size of economy, exchange rate stability, financial market development – foreign exchange market, financial markets, capital markets -, and political stability.
- Literature identifies some of these relevant. (Iwami and Sato, 1996 IJSE; Chinn and Frankel, 2008 NBER WP; Tavlas, 1997 IE)
- > More apt to become an international currency, the larger the economy (gdp, trade and financial markets), the more stable the value of the currency, the more developed and open the financial markets, the higher the export relative to the world exports, the more differentiated the manufacturing goods exports, the more exports headed to less developed economies, hysteresis and network externalities, the less the political risks....

#### International currency (by reserves)

Reserve currency in the world reserve (%)

Year	USD	UKP	FRF	DEM	NDG	SWF	JPY	EURO
1976	79.7	2	0.9	7	0.5	1.4	0.8	
1980	55.9	2.5	1.1	11.9	0.8	2.6	3.3	
1985	55.3	2.7	0.8	13.9	0.9	2.1	7.3	
1990	50.6	3	2.4	16.8	1.1	1.2	8	
1991	51.3	3.3	3	15.4	1.1	1.2	8.5	
1992	55.3	3.1	2.7	13.3	0.7	1	7.6	
1993	56.6	3	2.3	13.7	0.7	1.1	7.7	
1994	53.1	2.8	2.5	15.3	0.7	0.6	7.8	
1995	59	2.1	2.4	15.8	0.3	0.3	6.8	
1996	62.1	2.7	1.8	14.7	0.2	0.3	6.7	
1997	65.2	2.6	1.4	14.5	0.4	1.3	5.8	
1998	69.4	2.7	1.6	13.8	1.3	0.3	6.2	
1999	71	2.9				0.2	6.4	17.9
2000	71	2.8				0.3	6.1	18.4
2001	71.4	2.7				0.3	5.1	19.3
2002	67	2.8				0.4	4.4	23.9
2003	65.9	2.8				0.2	3.9	25.3
2004	65.8	3.4				0.2	3.8	25
2005	66.5	3.7				0.1	3.6	24.4
2006	66.1	6.3				0.2	3.1	24.7
2007	64.5	7.2				0.2	2.8	25.9

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#### Size of economy (GDP)

							the world	I GDP (%)
Year	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	swi	EURO
1980~1989	28.0	4.0	11.5	4.9	5.9	1.2	0.9	-
1990~1999	26.8	4.3	15.3	5.2	7.7	1.3	1.0	23.7
2000~2006	29.6	4.9	11.6	4.6	6.2	1.4	0.8	21.6
2001	32.1	4.6	13.0	4.2	6.0	1.3	0.8	20.0
2002	31.9	4.8	11.9	4.5	6.2	1.3	0.9	20.9
2003	29.7	4.9	11.5	4.9	6.6	1.5	0.9	23.0
2004	28.1	5.2	11.1	5.0	6.6	1.5	0.9	23.4
2005	27.7	5.0	10.2	4.8	6.2	1.4	0.8	22.4
2006	27.2	5.0	9.0	4.6	6.0	1.4	0.8	21.9
	KOR	CHN	SGP	HKG	IDN	MYS	PHL	THA
1980~1989	0.8	2.3	0.1	0.3	0.7	0.2	0.2	0.3
1990~1999	1.5	2.5	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.5
2000~2006	1.7	4.6	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
2001	1.5	4.2	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.3	0.2	0.4
2002	1.7	4.4	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
2003	1.6	4.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
2004	1.6	4.6	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
2005	1.8	5.0	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.4
2006	1.8	5.5	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.4

Nat'l GDP relative to the world GDP (%)

#### Size of economy (Exports)

Nat'l exports relative to the world exports (%)

						the world export				
Year	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	SWI	EURO		
1980~1989	12.0	5.5	7.8	5.9	9.5	3.5	2.1	33.8		
1990~1999	13.1	5.4	7.5	5.9	9.6	3.6	1.9	33.5		
2000~2005	11.7	5.0	5.8	4.8	8.8	3.4	1.6	30.5		
2001	13.2	5.2	5.9	5.0	8.6	3.3	1.6	30.4		
2002	12.2	5.2	5.8	4.9	8.9	3.3	1.7	30.9		
2003	10.9	5.0	5.7	5.0	9.3	3.5	1.7	31.9		
2004	10.2	4.9	5.6	4.7	9.3	3.5	1.6	31.3		
2005	9.9	4.6	5.3	4.3	8.8	3.3	1.5	29.7		
	KOR	CHN	SGP	НКС	IDN	MYS	PHL	THA		
1980~1989	1.4	1.2	1.2	n.a.	0.7	0.7	0.3	0.4		
1000 1000	1.7	1.2	1.2	n.a.	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.4		
1990~1999	2.1	2.3	2.1	3.0 <sup>2)</sup>	0.8	1.2	0.4	1.0		
2000~2005	2.5	4.9	2.2	2.9	0.8	1.3	0.4	1.0		
2001	2.4	3.9	2.2	3.1	0.8	1.3	0.5	1.0		
2002	2.4	4.6	2.1	3.1	0.8	1.4	0.5	1.0		
2003	2.5	5.2	2.1	2.9	0.7	1.3	0.4	1.0		
2004	2.7	5.8	2.2	2.8	0.7	1.3	0.4	1.0		
2005	2.6	6.5	2.2	2.7	0.8	1.3	0.3	1.0		

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Year	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	SWI	
1980~1989	5.6	7.4	2.5	7.4	n.a.	2.9	3.3	
1990~1999	3.0	3.7	1.2	1.9	2.0	2.4	2.3	
2000~2007	2.8	2.8	-0.3	1.8	1.7	2.2	0.9	
2001	2.8	1.8	-0.8	1.7	2.0	4.2	1.0	
2002	1.6	1.6	-0.9	1.9	1.4	3.3	0.6	
2003	2.3	2.9	-0.3	2.1	1.1	2.1	0.6	
2004	2.7	3.0	0.0	2.1	1.7	1.2	0.8	
2005	3.4	2.8	-0.3	1.8	2.0	1.7	1.2	
2006	3.2	3.2	0.2	1.6	1.7	1.1	1.1	
2007	2.9	4.3	0.1	1.5	2.1	1.6	0.7	
	KOR	CHN	SGP	HKG	IDN	MYS	PHL	TH/
1980~1989	8.4	14.8	2.8	7.5	9.6	3.7	14.9	5.8
1990~1999	5.7	7.8	1.9	6.9	14.5	3.7	9.0	5.0
2000~2007	3.0	1.6	1.0	-0.8	8.7	2.0	5.0	2.5
2001	4.1	0.5	1.0	-1.6	11.5	1.4	6.8	1.6
2002	2.8	-0.8	-0.4	-3.1	11.9	1.8	3.0	0.6
2003	3.5	1.2	0.5	-2.5	6.6	1.0	3.5	1.8
2004	3.6	3.9	1.7	-0.4	6.2	1.5	6.0	2.8
2005	2.8	1.8	0.4	0.9	10.5	3.0	7.6	4.5
2006	2.2	1.5	1.0	2.1	13.1	3.6	6.2	4.6
2007	2.5	4.8	2.1	2.0	6.4	2.0	2.8	2.2

#### Currency stability (monthly variation of SDR)

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							S.D of m changes	
Year	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	SWI	EU
1980~1989	1.81	2.27	2.13	1.79	1.81	1.78	2.22	
1990~1998	1.58	1.92	2.47	1.71	1.65	1.65	2.15	
1999~2006	1.23	1.53	1.87				1.57	1.4
2001	1.22	1.18	2.72				1.67	1.5
2002	1.45	1.33	1.26				1.54	1.3
2003	1.64	1.84	1.71				2.03	1.8
2004	1.26	1.50	2.57				1.56	1.4
2005	1.31	1.40	1.28				1.10	0.8
2006	1.06	1.64	1.24				1.29	1.2
2007	0.80	1.45	1.94				1.10	0.7
	KOR	CHN	SGP	НКС	IDN	MYS	PHL	TH
1980~1989	1.99	2.54	1.36	2.06	3.38	1.35	3.66	1.8
1990~1998	3.39	2.87	1.49	1.52	5.55	2.88	3.31	2.7
1999~2006	1.97	1.20	1.08	1.15	4.08	1.27	1.94	1.6
2001	2.20	1.18	1.11	1.20	7.76	1.22	2.32	1.5
2002	1.54	1.31	1.18	1.30	2.85	1.37	1.28	1.1
2003	2.39	1.57	1.03	1.46	1.51	1.60	1.38	1.2
2004	1.44	1.18	0.83	1.13	2.74	1.20	1.33	1.0
2005	1.24	1.14	1.16	1.09	2.42	1.16	1.64	1.2
2006	1.48	1.16	0.78	1.00	2.67	1.18	2.03	1.5
2007	1.29	0.97	0.89	0.84	2.13	1.45	1.70	1.1



#### Financial market restrictions, openness and exchange rate regime

	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	SWI	KOR	CHN	SGP	HKG	IDN	MYS	PHL	THA
Capital market securities	0	x	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	ο	x	ο	0	ο	ο
Money market instruments	0	x	0	0	0	х	0	0	0	х	х	0	0	0	0
Collective investment securities	0	x	0	0	0	х	0	0	0	х	х	0	0	0	0
Derivatives and other instruments	x	x	0	x	0	х	0	0	0	х	0	0	0	0	0
Commercial credits	x	x	x	x	x	х	x	x	0	х	х	0	0	0	x
Financial credits	х	х	0	х	0	x	0	0	0	0	х	0	0	0	0
Guarantees, securities, and financial backup facilities	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	0	o	о	0
Direct investment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	x	x	0	0	0	0
Liquidation of direct investment	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	х	x	х	x	х	x
Real estate transactions	x	x	0	x	0	х	0	0	0	0	x	0	0	0	0
Personal capital movements	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	0	x	x	x	0	0	0
Financial openness (Gross private capital flows/GDP, %)	14	123	16	33	31	94	84	7	11	96	78	7	24	18	13
Source: AREAER, IMF & World Econor Exchange rate regime	nic Indic float	ators ( float	WB) float	float	float	float	peg	float	Crawl ing	Mana ged	Curre ncy	Mana ged	Mana ged	float	Mana ged
									peg	float	board	float	float		float



#### Exports to less-developed economies (%)

1980	41.60	27.91	52.30	28.36	23.36	13.75	26.12	31.66	51.71	58.36	36.57	22.27	40.05	24.53	41.84
1990	35.82	18.74	41.14	19.57	19.23	9.87	20.58	24.60	63.18	50.07	46.48	29.52	49.39	20.70	32.09
1998	43.29	20.11	45.54	20.87	24.51	14.00	20.20	51.15	44.37	52.29	51.45	46.36	47.93	29.31	39.49
2002	44.94	18.25	51.53	22.21	25.88	13.26	22.28	52.18	45.14	60.65	56.35	47.20	52.67	39.84	44.89
2006	48.25	20.51	59.04	25.05	29.84	16.80	24.08	61.48	47.99	68.12	63.68	53.28	55.97	45.12	53.45
2007	48.92	22.63	61.38	25.92	30.72	18.49	28.48	65.79	49.86	70.34	67.67	54.52	58.52	62.95	56.21

Exports of machinary and transports equipment (%)

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1980	40.96	34.70	54.91	33.71	n.a.	16.61	33.49	6.22	19.78	n.a.	28.41	19.01	0.50	11.51	2.6
1990	47.16	40.00	65.94	37.14	n.a.	22.17	31.71	20.10	36.92	17.63	48.12	24.35	1.44	33.59	18.1
1330	47.10	40.00	00.94	57.14	n.a.	22.17	51.71	20.10	50.52	17.05	40.12	24.00	1.77	33.33	10.1
1998	53.29	48.35	66.18	43.75	50.34	33.30	31.69	39.92	50.79	25.34	66.42	31.45	10.14	56.34	72.3
2002	51.02	42.24	64.85	43.68	51.83	31.20	27.04	41.93	59.80	35.57	64.87	39.49	14.18	58.95	75.9
2006	48.36	42.45	62.82	41.25	49.10	29.72	24.92	44.37	58.74	44.12	60.13	50.17	12.87	52.37	69.9

#### Country risks (Dec., 2007)


	USA	GBR	JPN	FRA	DEU	NLD	SWI	KOR	CHN	SGP	HKG	IDN	MYS	PHL	THA
Political risk	77	82	79	79.5	87.5	84.5	89	78	70.5	84.5	83	62	75.5	60.5	56
Corruption	4	4	3	5	5	5	4.5	2.5	2.5	4.5	4	3.5	2.5	2	1.5
Bureaucracy	4	4	4	3	4	4	4	3	2	4	3	2	3	3	2
Government stability	8	6	6.5	9.5	10	7	9.5	6.5	11	11	10.5	7.5	9	5	6.5
Investment	12	12	11.5	12	12	12	12	10	7	12	12	9	9.5	9	7
Internal conflict	10	9.5	10.5	9	11	10	12	10	10.5	10.5	11	9	10	6.5	8
External conflict	7	7	9.5	10	10.5	12	11	9	10	10.5	10.5	10.5	10	11	10
Military in politics	4	6	5	5.5	6	6	6	4	3	5	5	2.5	5	3.5	3.5
Religious tensions	5.5	6	5.5	4	6	2.5	4.5	6	5	4.5	5	1	4	3	2
Law and order	5	5.5	5	5	5	6	5	5	4.5	5	5	3	4	2.5	2.5
Ethnic tensions	5	4	5.5	2.5	4	4.5	4	6	4.5	6	5	2	4	5	2
Democratic accountability	6	6	5	6	6	6	6	6	1.5	2	2.5	5	4.5	5	4.5
Socio	8.5	10	8	8	8	9.5	10.5	10	9	9.5	9.5	7	10	5	6.5
Financial Risk	30.5	40	46.5	38.5	39.5	40.5	44	43	48.5	44.5	41	40.5	43.5	38	41.5
Economic Risk	38.5	39.5	42.5	39.5	44	45	46	43	42	47	48	38.5	43	40	39.5
Composite risk	73	80.7	84	78.7	85.5	85	89.5	82	80.5	88	86	70.5	81	69.2	68.5


Source: ICRG(the International Country Risk Guide), PRS Group


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#### III. Momentum for a regional currency regime in East Asia


- Currency competition in East Asia would happen as EA nations cope with the crisis.
- > East Asia is a combination of large and small economies with differing degrees of openness in financial markets and exchange regimes. But it is a well integrated trade area.
- Large economies as well as smaller economies would be interested in diminishing the impacts of external shocks to their national economies. They would tend to opt policies that favors the use of their own currencies rather than for instance the USD.
- > The best place to start with is East Asia. Larger economies and richer net exporters are in the better position to start as they have stronger bargaining power.
- > Will importers in EA prefer currencies other than USD to USD?









Source: Coordinated Investment Portfolio Survey, IMF







### Concluding remarks

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#### Currency competition or currency coordination for EA?

- >The current crisis provides enough incentive for EA economies to pursue internationalization of their currencies. But the lack of financial and foreign exchange market competitiveness hinders the progress.
- Some EA economies would be ready to accept other EA currency for, say, clearing their trade, if it is less costly than using USD. The shortage of USD liquidity is a favorable factor for those EA countries with liquidity problem to opt more easily for the former.
- This in turn opens the possibility to take the road for the single currency in East Asia. If they have to choose other EA currency, why not an Asian currency?
- >What about those who do not have to consider choosing other EA currency?

