Governing Nuclear in East Asia:

Sub-theme 4: Security in East Asia

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Points of Presentation

- Background: East Asia as a 'Nuclear Dense' Region
- Security
 - Managing nuclear proliferation: North Korean nuclear crisis
 - Controlling tensions and establishing strategic stability: U.S.-Japan-China relationship
- Nuclear Energy
 - Regional solution for fuel cycle management?
- Case of Six Party Talk:
 - Governing the risks and promoting peace and prosperity of the region

Background

Global Non-Proliferation Regime in question

- Proliferation cases : North Korea, Iran, and non-state actors
- Universality (190 member states) vs exceptionalism (case of cooperation with India as non party to the NPT
- Lack of enforcement capability, sanctions through the UN Security Council do not have immediate impact.
 - ⇒ Cannot provide effective solution for cases of non-compliance

Regional Political and Security Environment

- The legacy of the Cold War
 - divided states
 - ideological differences (liberal democracies vs authoritarian regimes)
- Lack of confidence among regional actors: regional rivalries and historical legacy
- ▶ Element (not a whole picture, though) of strategic confrontation
 - ▶ US-Japan vs China, US-ROK vs DPRK

Nuclear Dense East Asia

Nuclear armed states

- China, Russia are formal nuclear weapons states (NWS) under the NPT in the region.
- The United States, another formal NWS of the NPT, is an indispensable actor in the regional security.
- North Korea is a declared nuclear armed states under the violation of the NPT.

Nuclear energy states

- Japan is the largest non-NWS possessing nuclear power plants as well as a full scale nuclear fuel cycle program.
- South Korea depends its nuclear energy program on 40 percent of its electricity needs. It also has expressed an interest in conducting R&D of pyroprocessing, a technology to reprocess spent fuel.
- Taiwan also has a large scale nuclear energy program.
- Mongolia possesses a large scale uranium reserve.

Need for Managing 'Nuclear Risks' (1)

Security dimension

- North Korean nuclear blackmail (and attacks)
- Proliferation from North Korea
- Rising strategic rivalries
 - Potential of nuclear arms races triggered by the modernization of Chinese nuclear arsenal
 - It could also bring about the sense of uncertainty on NNWSs (particular Japan and South Korea) in the region.

Managing Nuclear Order in East Asia

Energy dimension

- Potential escalation of business competition
 - US-Japan nuclear business partnership (Hitachi-GE, Toshiba-Westinghouse)
 - strong Korean nuclear consortium (which won a contract with UAE, beating US-Japan and France)
 - a potential rise of Chinese nuclear industry
- Spent fuel management
 - storage for spent fuel in South Korea and Taiwan will face the shortage soon, and maybe Japan as well in the future. Quest for solutions by individual states?
- Interests in nuclear fuel cycle
 - In East Asia, only Japan is allowed to conduct fuel cycle program under bilateral agreement with the US. Japan has a full scale fuel cycle activity, an exceptional case as a NNWS.
 - South Korea is interested in conducting R&D of pyroprocessing, a type of backend solution, but not allowed by the US.

Need for Regional Governance Mechanisms

- ▶ Global non-proliferation regime has weak enforcement mechanism and cannot effectively deal with North Korean case. ⇒specific approach is needed.
- All parties in the region express strong interests in utilization of nuclear energy, and share common concern over spent fuel management.
- All parties in the region hold technological competence to be able to manage fuel cycle technology, but so far only Japan is allowed to operate such technology.
 - ⇒rising pressure for easing this inequality. Potential need for a regional framework.

Case of Regional Governance: Six Party Talk

- ▶ Established in 2003 after the revelation of North Korea's enrichment program in 2002.
- Members: all major stakeholders in the region=North Korea, China (as a coordinator), the US, South Korea, Japan and Russia
- Aiming at complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korean nuclear weapons program
- At the same time, addressing and coordinating diverse priorities of members; peace mechanism in the Korean Peninsula, regional security, abduction issue, economic assistance, and etc.
- But negotiation with North Korea is not necessarily smooth, due to domestic political factors in each state.

Why Six Party Talk Needed?

- As a flexible mechanism for pursuing long term and short term goals at the same time:
 - Long term: Ultimate objective is to have North Korea comply with non-proliferation norms.
 - Short term: Crisis management in the process is another priority.
- Need to manage different priorities
- Flexible in approaches and measures taken for this ultimate goal.
- Therefore, proposed solutions are sometimes in contradiction with rules and procedures set by the regime, but supplementing with its flexibility.

Conclusion

- Regional governance mechanisms for controlling and reducing nuclear risks are important tools to supplement the shortcomings of the global non-proliferation regime.
- Flexibility is a key to coordinate diverse interests and to pursue multiple policy objectives.
- But such flexibility may sometimes conflict with rules and procedures of the global regime. = it may have risk of giving wrong lessons to potential proliferators.
- Governance structure is a combination of the global regime to provide principles and norms, a regional mechanism to accommodate diverse interests, and political will of engagement by parties concerned toward the success of the process.

Thank you very much